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submitted 5 days ago* (last edited 16 hours ago) by iso to c/meta

Edit: We have a database error and that breaks unpinning posts functionality. I had eye surgery at Monday and I have to rest about a week. I’ll fix this problem whenever I can. Sorry for the inconvenience.

I will upgrade the Lemmy version to 0.19.4 on Sunday 10:00 UTC. Therefore, we’ll experience about 1 hour downtime.

Normally, I do not announce these version upgrades, but since the database will also be upgraded and migrated, down time may increase in case of a problem.

For local time: https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/fixedtime.html?msg=lemy.lol+update&iso=20240609T10&p1=1440&ah=1

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Armadillo (lemmy.world)
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submitted 56 minutes ago by Ninjazzon@infosec.pub to c/opensource@lemmy.ml

Flameshot is a free and open-source, cross-platform tool to take screenshots with many built-in features to save you time.

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its crime time (lemmy.world)
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submitted 58 minutes ago by boem@lemmy.world to c/technology@lemmy.world
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Small rule (lemmy.blahaj.zone)
submitted 1 hour ago* (last edited 1 hour ago) by celeste@lemmy.blahaj.zone to c/196@lemmy.blahaj.zone

Screencap of an Instagramm post by pun_bible: "My dad is an electrician in a zoo and look how he spent his morning I'm crying" Below are 3 pictures of a meercat holding a screwdriver, looking in a toolbox and touching a helplight.

Reply by ConradkBarwa: "Your dad small as hell"

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submitted 25 minutes ago by boem@lemmy.world to c/world@lemmy.world
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Es wäre lustig wenn es nicht so traurig wäre das trotzdem Leute diesen Müllhaufen wählen. Kontext.

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submitted 42 minutes ago by 0x815@feddit.de to c/finance@beehaw.org

Data for May due this week is forecast to show a resumption of loan growth after a shock contraction in April, the first for almost two decades. But nobody expects a return to the days when Beijing would engineer borrowing booms to speed up the world’s second-biggest economy.

Especially since the 2008 crash, China has pumped out credit to build homes and infrastructure, which kept the economy humming. Now it’s stuck in a housing slump and already has plenty of roads and high-speed rail. Policymakers are seeking new ways to sustain growth — like high-tech manufacturing — that won’t rely so much on expanding debt.

China's Loan, Credit Growth Keeps Slowing Amid Weak Demand

The People’s Bank of China has repeatedly signaled it has no intention of revving up the lending engine again. Even if it wanted to, there’s little demand for credit. Government bond sales picked up last month, but the real estate crisis has left Chinese households and businesses reluctant to finance spending or investment by taking on new debts.

“Household savings that used to go into property are now going into the financial system, but there aren’t enough borrowers on the other side,” said Adam Wolfe, an emerging-market economist at Absolute Strategy Research. The PBOC is “trying to create a new normal for credit growth,” he said.

If that effort succeeds, Chinese debt may lose its status as a strong leading indicator for the country’s business cycle — and hence for global commodity markets.

To see how that’s worked over the past 15 years or so, one useful guide is the credit impulse, which measures the ratio of new debt to gross domestic product. It shows four distinct spurts of stimulus since 2009.

China's Credit Cycle Fails to Pick Up Again

As recently as early 2021, China was building its way out of the pandemic in a credit-fueled construction boom that sucked in raw materials from across the planet and helped drive a broad commodity rally.

Around that time, Federal Reserve researchers concluded that China’s credit policies explained more than one-fifth of all commodity-price movements since the global financial crisis. In a separate study, they estimated that when China’s credit impulse rose by 1% of GDP, it delivered a matching boost to global trade – and a 2.2% increase in commodity prices – as well as lifting the Chinese economy.

But since 2022 the credit impulse has essentially flatlined.

“The credit growth data is still a reference to gauge Chinese industrial activities, but it’s a less-strong indicator now,” said Li Xuezhi, head of Chaos Ternary Research Institute, a commodity analysis firm. The economy used to be led by property and infrastructure investments, but the “new quality productive forces” that Beijing is now backing involve other forms of financing like venture capital, Li said.

The lending slowdown is spurring debate over various alarming scenarios for China’s economy. One is a “liquidity trap,” where lower borrowing costs are unable to stimulate growth. Another is a “balance sheet recession,” where households and companies are focused on clearing debts rather than spending.

As China seeks a growth model based on improving productivity instead of expanding debt, the PBOC’s priority is to make sure existing funds are used more efficiently, according to Wolfe. To the extent it succeeds, “the relationship between aggregate credit and the industrial cycle should break down,” and there are signs that it already is, he said.

Authorities took steps in recent years to rein in over-indebted real estate developers and clean up so-called hidden debt owed by local governments, which doesn’t appear on their balance sheets. Property and local government financing vehicles accounted for about 70% of new credit generated over the past decade, according to an estimate by Zhang Bin, a researcher with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

The PBOC is also trying to make sure credit is reaching the real economy, instead of idling within the financial system. Authorities have cracked down on loopholes that allowed companies to make fake loans, arbitraging between higher deposit rates and cheaper borrowing.

An era when loan growth was seen as a key benchmark, by investors and policymakers alike, has left banks with incentives to plump up their numbers.

A case in point is the short-term interbank loans known as bankers’ acceptances. Their cost fell to the lowest level this year in May, according to data from Zhongtai Securities Co. That’s usually a sign that lenders are swapping bills with each other to boost loans

because they’re struggling to find companies that want to borrow.

Even if such techniques help to boost the loan figures coming this week, investors won’t be impressed and will look deeper, said Mary Xia, research director at Beijing Jifeng Asset Management Co.

“The market understands that the weak credit growth is due to problems on the demand side,” she said.

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Rule to unshid pant (lemmy.blahaj.zone)
submitted 1 hour ago* (last edited 1 hour ago) by glizzyguzzler@lemmy.blahaj.zone to c/196@lemmy.blahaj.zone
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Rule (lemmy.blahaj.zone)
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submitted 20 minutes ago by Blaze@lemmy.zip to c/linux@programming.dev
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submitted 20 minutes ago by caos@feddit.de to c/80smusic@lemmy.world

Lyrics:

Harry Truman, Doris Day, Red China, Johnnie Ray South Pacific, Walter Winchell, Joe DiMaggio Joe McCarthy, Richard Nixon, Studebaker, television North Korea, South Korea, Marilyn Monroe

Rosenbergs, H-bomb, Sugar Ray, Panmunjom Brando, The King and I and The Catcher in the Rye Eisenhower, vaccine, England′s got a new queen Marciano, Liberace, Santayana goodbye

We didn't start the fire It was always burning since the world′s been turning We didn't start the fire No we didn't light it but we tried to fight it

Joseph Stalin, Malenkov, Nasser and Prokofiev Rockefeller, Campanella, Communist Bloc Roy Cohn, Juan Peron, Toscanini, dacron Dien Bien Phu falls, Rock Around the Clock

Einstein, James Dean, Brooklyn′s got a winning team Davy Crockett, Peter Pan, Elvis Presley, Disneyland Bardot, Budapest, Alabama, Krushchev Princess Grace, Peyton Place, trouble in the Suez

We didn′t start the fire It was always burning since the world's been turning We didn′t start the fire No we didn't light it but we tried to fight it

Little Rock, Pasternak, Mickey Mantle, Kerouac Sputnik, Chou En-Lai, Bridge on the River Kwai Lebanon, Charles de Gaulle, California baseball Starkweather, homicide, children of thalidomide

Uh, a-ho

Buddy Holly, Ben Hur, space monkey, Mafia Hula hoops, Castro, Edsel is a no-go U-2, Syngman Rhee, payola and Kennedy Chubby Checker, Psycho, Belgians in the Congo

We didn′t start the fire It was always burning since the world's been turning We didn′t start the fire No we didn't light it but we tried to fight it

Hemingway, Eichmann, Stranger in a Strange Land Dylan, Berlin, Bay of Pigs invasion Lawrence of Arabia, British Beatlemania Ole Miss, John Glenn, Liston beats Patterson Pope Paul, Malcolm X, British politician sex JFK, blown away, what else do I have to say

We didn't start the fire It was always burning since the world′s been turning We didn′t start the fire No we didn't light it but we tried to fight it

Birth control, Ho Chi Minh, Richard Nixon back again Moonshot, Woodstock, Watergate, punk rock Begin, Reagan, Palestine, terror on the airline Ayatollah′s in Iran, Russians in Afghanistan

Wheel of Fortune, Sally Ride, heavy metal, suicide Foreign debts, homeless vets, AIDS, crack, Bernie Goetz Hypodermics on the shores, China's under martial law Rock and roller cola wars, I can′t take it anymore

We didn't start the fire It was always burning since the world′s been turning We didn't start the fire But when we are gone Will it still burn on, and on, and on And on, and on, and on, and on, and on?

We didn't start the fire It was always burning since the world′s been turning We didn′t start the fire No we didn't light it but we tried to fight it

We didn′t start the fire It was always burning since the world's been turning We didn′t start the fire No we didn't light it but we tried to fight it

We didn′t start the fire It was always burning since the world's been turning We didn't start the fire

19
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submitted 41 minutes ago by 0x815@feddit.de to c/china@sopuli.xyz

Data for May due this week is forecast to show a resumption of loan growth after a shock contraction in April, the first for almost two decades. But nobody expects a return to the days when Beijing would engineer borrowing booms to speed up the world’s second-biggest economy.

Especially since the 2008 crash, China has pumped out credit to build homes and infrastructure, which kept the economy humming. Now it’s stuck in a housing slump and already has plenty of roads and high-speed rail. Policymakers are seeking new ways to sustain growth — like high-tech manufacturing — that won’t rely so much on expanding debt.

China's Loan, Credit Growth Keeps Slowing Amid Weak Demand

The People’s Bank of China has repeatedly signaled it has no intention of revving up the lending engine again. Even if it wanted to, there’s little demand for credit. Government bond sales picked up last month, but the real estate crisis has left Chinese households and businesses reluctant to finance spending or investment by taking on new debts.

“Household savings that used to go into property are now going into the financial system, but there aren’t enough borrowers on the other side,” said Adam Wolfe, an emerging-market economist at Absolute Strategy Research. The PBOC is “trying to create a new normal for credit growth,” he said.

If that effort succeeds, Chinese debt may lose its status as a strong leading indicator for the country’s business cycle — and hence for global commodity markets.

To see how that’s worked over the past 15 years or so, one useful guide is the credit impulse, which measures the ratio of new debt to gross domestic product. It shows four distinct spurts of stimulus since 2009.

China's Credit Cycle Fails to Pick Up Again

As recently as early 2021, China was building its way out of the pandemic in a credit-fueled construction boom that sucked in raw materials from across the planet and helped drive a broad commodity rally.

Around that time, Federal Reserve researchers concluded that China’s credit policies explained more than one-fifth of all commodity-price movements since the global financial crisis. In a separate study, they estimated that when China’s credit impulse rose by 1% of GDP, it delivered a matching boost to global trade – and a 2.2% increase in commodity prices – as well as lifting the Chinese economy.

But since 2022 the credit impulse has essentially flatlined.

“The credit growth data is still a reference to gauge Chinese industrial activities, but it’s a less-strong indicator now,” said Li Xuezhi, head of Chaos Ternary Research Institute, a commodity analysis firm. The economy used to be led by property and infrastructure investments, but the “new quality productive forces” that Beijing is now backing involve other forms of financing like venture capital, Li said.

The lending slowdown is spurring debate over various alarming scenarios for China’s economy. One is a “liquidity trap,” where lower borrowing costs are unable to stimulate growth. Another is a “balance sheet recession,” where households and companies are focused on clearing debts rather than spending.

As China seeks a growth model based on improving productivity instead of expanding debt, the PBOC’s priority is to make sure existing funds are used more efficiently, according to Wolfe. To the extent it succeeds, “the relationship between aggregate credit and the industrial cycle should break down,” and there are signs that it already is, he said.

Authorities took steps in recent years to rein in over-indebted real estate developers and clean up so-called hidden debt owed by local governments, which doesn’t appear on their balance sheets. Property and local government financing vehicles accounted for about 70% of new credit generated over the past decade, according to an estimate by Zhang Bin, a researcher with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

The PBOC is also trying to make sure credit is reaching the real economy, instead of idling within the financial system. Authorities have cracked down on loopholes that allowed companies to make fake loans, arbitraging between higher deposit rates and cheaper borrowing.

An era when loan growth was seen as a key benchmark, by investors and policymakers alike, has left banks with incentives to plump up their numbers.

A case in point is the short-term interbank loans known as bankers’ acceptances. Their cost fell to the lowest level this year in May, according to data from Zhongtai Securities Co. That’s usually a sign that lenders are swapping bills with each other to boost loans

because they’re struggling to find companies that want to borrow.

Even if such techniques help to boost the loan figures coming this week, investors won’t be impressed and will look deeper, said Mary Xia, research director at Beijing Jifeng Asset Management Co.

“The market understands that the weak credit growth is due to problems on the demand side,” she said.

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4
Embrace Tradition (streamable.com)
submitted 12 minutes ago* (last edited 6 minutes ago) by nuke@sh.itjust.works to c/noncredibledefense@sh.itjust.works

I just... I don't know anymore.

Mirror: https://files.catbox.moe/ffp81h.mp4

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I stole another gallery post from [REDDacted]

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submitted 48 minutes ago by Kolanaki@yiffit.net to c/dadjokes@lemmy.world

Sam and cheese.

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Mine is Tunnet. Maybe someone found some gem? Itch.io games also counts, just needs to be made in Bevy!

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submitted 29 minutes ago by 0x815@feddit.de to c/news@lemmy.world

They look like simple fishing boats but are capable of swarming in huge numbers to help Beijing stake its territorial claims in the South China Sea

Chinese fishing boats started swarming the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea in mid May. Some had already been drifting around the picturesque reef in the Philippines exclusive economic zone for some time.

However, the Chinese boats were not regular fishing vessels, and they weren’t there to fish. They were there to counter a Philippine aid flotilla aiming to deliver supplies to fishers near the disputed shoal. In the end, the aid flotilla turned back before it reached the shoal.

The Chinese vessels were part of a maritime militia, a shadowy armada whose existence Beijing rarely acknowledges and that it has long used to help hold or take disputed territory it says it owns in the region.

The militia has a long history in the area. Its key role in seizing Scarborough Shoal in 2012 set off one of the most high-profile territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

The shoal is just one of a range of sites that have seen dangerous clashes between China and other competing claimant nations. The tensions have escalated to make the South China Sea a potential flashpoint in one of the most strategically and economically important waterways in the world.

What is the maritime militia?

The maritime militia has existed for decades but has become more professional, better equipped, and more militarised under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, who has overhauled China’s armed forces since taking power in 2012.

It is made up of two main forces. One is the professional fleet of at least 100 purpose-built boats which have the appearance of fishing vessels. The other fleet, known as the Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels (SBFV), is a larger group of actual fishing boats that operate out of ports across Hainan and Guangdong, and have been drafted into China’s missions.

The professional fleet consists of stronger boats with better, often military-grade equipment. They’re usually visible on satellite tracking platforms swarming around disputed locations.

The SBFV is harder to spot, and usually have lower grade satellite transmitters or none at all. Some have had structural and technological upgrades.

Crews in both fleets are believed to be civilian fishers and sailors as well as ex-military personnel recruited through a Chinese government training program. The vessels tend to have a smaller crew of about five to six if engaging in militia activities as opposed to genuine trawling, according to South China Sea expert Greg Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI).

How are they funded?

Militia are primarily funded through various government subsidies, and some personnel receive full-time salaries from state-owned companies, according to the AMTI. The SBFV crews also receive lucrative government fuel subsidies for militia missions, an income that disincentivises them fishing.

"These [crews] could fish if they wanted to, and occasionally they do, but mostly they sit quietly and then raft together [at disputed locations],” says Ray Powell, director of SeaLight, a maritime transparency project at Stanford University. “It’s most economical to just sit there and not use the fuel.”

A 2021 investigative report by the AMTI said there was “no longer any question about whether the militia is organised, funded and directed by the government of China”. It said Beijing was legally responsible for the militia’s actions, which “violate several tenets of international law”. The Chinese government rarely acknowledges the militia’s activities, or that they are anything other than fishing boats operating in what they say are traditional Chinese waters.

Beijing defends its operations in places like the Scarborough Shoal as acts of “rights protections”, but rarely concedes that the militia is part of it. It acknowledges the existence of the militia, but is “cagey” about what boats are actually in it, says Powell.

Employment contracts and state media articles reveal explicit directions from officials regarding their “political responsibilities” to operate in particular areas, and support the military when required. Towns that develop professional militia fleets have received government accolades and even visits from Xi for their efforts.

How does it operate?

The militia operates across the region, including the Yellow Sea and in the exclusive economic zones of Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia, but right now observers are focusing on activity in the South China Sea, where the brinkmanship is escalating, especially with the Philippines.

The fleets conduct intrusive journeys through foreign exclusive economic zones, blockade disputed reefs and islands, and have repeatedly rammed or used water cannon on other vessels in dangerous manoeuvres, including against the US Navy. Militia boats will often raft together to create a risk of collision and impede access, or camp out at a reef for months, strengthening China’s physical presence in a region where that presence is key to controlling a site.

Statements from Chinese officials suggest the professional fleet is called on first for more aggressive operations.

“The professional fleet is a direct threat, but smaller. The [SBFV] fleet is larger but a nuisance. They just drop anchor,” says Poling. “Governments have to treat them in different ways. One is a military threat, and one as a pain in the neck, which is a law enforcement problem.”

What have other countries said about it?

World governments and bodies have repeatedly condemned China’s behaviour in the South China Sea, including operations involving the maritime militia.

The US, which is a treaty ally of the Philippines, has repeatedly accused the militia of violating international law “to enforce its expansive and unlawful maritime claims”.

The Philippines, which is the target of most recent militia activity, says it “will not be deterred from pursuing legitimate and lawful activities in our maritime zones”.

Poling says the Philippines is pushing back more than it used to.“On the Philippines side they don’t see any other option,” he said.

It hasn’t really responded to the regional resistance, Poling says, and is instead “pushing the Philippines and other neighbours to form anti-China coalitions”.

“China was willing to do crazy stuff and everyone backed down [in the past]. But now they’re not, and like a school bully China doesn’t know what to do now.”

25
7
submitted 51 minutes ago by 0x815@feddit.de to c/china@sopuli.xyz

They look like simple fishing boats but are capable of swarming in huge numbers to help Beijing stake its territorial claims in the South China Sea

Chinese fishing boats started swarming the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea in mid May. Some had already been drifting around the picturesque reef in the Philippines exclusive economic zone for some time.

However, the Chinese boats were not regular fishing vessels, and they weren’t there to fish. They were there to counter a Philippine aid flotilla aiming to deliver supplies to fishers near the disputed shoal. In the end, the aid flotilla turned back before it reached the shoal.

The Chinese vessels were part of a maritime militia, a shadowy armada whose existence Beijing rarely acknowledges and that it has long used to help hold or take disputed territory it says it owns in the region.

The militia has a long history in the area. Its key role in seizing Scarborough Shoal in 2012 set off one of the most high-profile territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

The shoal is just one of a range of sites that have seen dangerous clashes between China and other competing claimant nations. The tensions have escalated to make the South China Sea a potential flashpoint in one of the most strategically and economically important waterways in the world.

What is the maritime militia?

The maritime militia has existed for decades but has become more professional, better equipped, and more militarised under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, who has overhauled China’s armed forces since taking power in 2012.

It is made up of two main forces. One is the professional fleet of at least 100 purpose-built boats which have the appearance of fishing vessels. The other fleet, known as the Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels (SBFV), is a larger group of actual fishing boats that operate out of ports across Hainan and Guangdong, and have been drafted into China’s missions.

The professional fleet consists of stronger boats with better, often military-grade equipment. They’re usually visible on satellite tracking platforms swarming around disputed locations.

The SBFV is harder to spot, and usually have lower grade satellite transmitters or none at all. Some have had structural and technological upgrades.

Crews in both fleets are believed to be civilian fishers and sailors as well as ex-military personnel recruited through a Chinese government training program. The vessels tend to have a smaller crew of about five to six if engaging in militia activities as opposed to genuine trawling, according to South China Sea expert Greg Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI).

How are they funded?

Militia are primarily funded through various government subsidies, and some personnel receive full-time salaries from state-owned companies, according to the AMTI. The SBFV crews also receive lucrative government fuel subsidies for militia missions, an income that disincentivises them fishing.

"These [crews] could fish if they wanted to, and occasionally they do, but mostly they sit quietly and then raft together [at disputed locations],” says Ray Powell, director of SeaLight, a maritime transparency project at Stanford University. “It’s most economical to just sit there and not use the fuel.”

A 2021 investigative report by the AMTI said there was “no longer any question about whether the militia is organised, funded and directed by the government of China”. It said Beijing was legally responsible for the militia’s actions, which “violate several tenets of international law”. The Chinese government rarely acknowledges the militia’s activities, or that they are anything other than fishing boats operating in what they say are traditional Chinese waters.

Beijing defends its operations in places like the Scarborough Shoal as acts of “rights protections”, but rarely concedes that the militia is part of it. It acknowledges the existence of the militia, but is “cagey” about what boats are actually in it, says Powell.

Employment contracts and state media articles reveal explicit directions from officials regarding their “political responsibilities” to operate in particular areas, and support the military when required. Towns that develop professional militia fleets have received government accolades and even visits from Xi for their efforts.

How does it operate?

The militia operates across the region, including the Yellow Sea and in the exclusive economic zones of Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia, but right now observers are focusing on activity in the South China Sea, where the brinkmanship is escalating, especially with the Philippines.

The fleets conduct intrusive journeys through foreign exclusive economic zones, blockade disputed reefs and islands, and have repeatedly rammed or used water cannon on other vessels in dangerous manoeuvres, including against the US Navy. Militia boats will often raft together to create a risk of collision and impede access, or camp out at a reef for months, strengthening China’s physical presence in a region where that presence is key to controlling a site.

Statements from Chinese officials suggest the professional fleet is called on first for more aggressive operations.

“The professional fleet is a direct threat, but smaller. The [SBFV] fleet is larger but a nuisance. They just drop anchor,” says Poling. “Governments have to treat them in different ways. One is a military threat, and one as a pain in the neck, which is a law enforcement problem.”

What have other countries said about it?

World governments and bodies have repeatedly condemned China’s behaviour in the South China Sea, including operations involving the maritime militia.

The US, which is a treaty ally of the Philippines, has repeatedly accused the militia of violating international law “to enforce its expansive and unlawful maritime claims”.

The Philippines, which is the target of most recent militia activity, says it “will not be deterred from pursuing legitimate and lawful activities in our maritime zones”.

Poling says the Philippines is pushing back more than it used to.“On the Philippines side they don’t see any other option,” he said.

It hasn’t really responded to the regional resistance, Poling says, and is instead “pushing the Philippines and other neighbours to form anti-China coalitions”.

“China was willing to do crazy stuff and everyone backed down [in the past]. But now they’re not, and like a school bully China doesn’t know what to do now.”

view more: next ›

lemy.lol

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56 users here now

lemy.lol is a long-term, general purpose Lemmy instance.


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